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In this article, we address the question of power in networked publics on Twitter in 
anti-fascist protests. The study is based on the results of an analysis of tweets, which 
are part of a dataset of three qualitative case studies about nationalist demonstra-
tions in Germany accompanied by counter-protests by anti-fascist groups, NGOs, and 
civil society. The question asked within this framework is how Twitter is used in the 
power struggles of the anti-fascist counter protests. The article concludes by identifying 
tactics, practices, and strategies that activists use both to contest power and to repro-
duce power on Twitter in interplay with functionalities of the technology and the polit-
ical (i.e. socio-cultural) context. This leads us to a discussion of power in and between 
networked publics as part of a communication spiral in a larger media environment.
Introduction
“Anti-fascists tweet with #L1610! Nazis tweet with #RaZ10! Pass it on!” (15/10/2010)1 was 
one of the first tweets that was frequently re-tweeted prior to a nationalist demonstration 
and counter-protest by anti-fascists and civil society networks in Leipzig on October 16, 
2010. A few months later, in February 2011, radical right-wing groups mobilised for a march 
taking place on February 13 and 19 in the city of Dresden, again accompanied by huge 
counter-protests aimed at blocking the march. In all of these events, the social web was 
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used intensively not only for mobilisation and coordination but also to interact with the 
news media. Although the internet was developed within the framework of control in the 
Cold War, it turned into a utopia of digital collaboration based on hippie culture and rebel-
lion against the war (Turner, 2006; Castells, 2001). This utopia translated into an overly opti-
mistic perspective on the internet’s grassroots democratic potential relative to controlled 
and manipulative mass media. Through different modalities with immediate distribution 
potentials, the network structure provided by the web was hoped to overcome existing 
power relations and lead to more evenly distributed communication flows. 
Twitter in particular has recently been discussed as an enabler of grassroots action 
but also critically evaluated in relation to political uprisings in Egypt (Zuckerman, 2011) 
and Moldova (Morozov, 2009). However, even though Twitter might offer possibilities for 
engagement, it can also be considered oppressive due to factors such as ownership, use and 
control of information, surveillance, and privacy. As Winner (1986) argues, technologies 
are inherently political since they are designed for a specific purpose that fosters certain 
appropriations more than others. Feenberg (2010, p. 6) argues that technologies reproduce 
existing hierarchies and systems of power but can be appropriated for subversive action to 
challenge power and lead to political change. Consequently, the constraints and possibili-
ties of a technological environment differ in different political situations.   
In this article, we investigate power and contestation on Twitter in anti-fascist coun-
ter protests within the framework of networked publics based on a qualitative analysis of 
tweets in the protest events. How is power reproduced and challenged in anti-fascist coun-
ter protests on Twitter? To answer this question, we identify tactics, media practices, and 
strategies used by activists for contesting power as well as situations in which it becomes 
apparent that power is reproduced on Twitter. We discuss power in networked publics on 
Twitter as the interplay between the technical affordances (Hutchby, 2001) of the technol-
ogy and the political (i.e. socio-cultural, context).
Anti-fascist protests on Twitter: case, context, and data
Since 2009, Dresden, the capital of the German state of Saxony, has played an important 
role in the discussion of right-wing politics from political, legal, and social perspectives. 
The march organised by the National Democratic Party (NPD), Youth Association of East 
Germany (JLO), and affiliated radical right-wing groups occurs on February 13 (and in 2011, 
on February 19 as well), a day used to commemorate the victims of World War II. This has 
been accompanied by huge blockades and other forms of counter protest by civil society 
and anti-fascist groups. In 2011, around 20,000 counter protesters involved in blockades 
opposed around 2000 neo-Nazis.
Publicly available online communication and representation concerning the following 
events were included in the data collection: [1] Several nationalist ad hoc marches organised 
by the Young National Democrats (Junge Nationaldemokraten) under the slogan ‘Right to 
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a Future’ (Recht auf Zukunft) in Leipzig, Germany on October 16, 2010 and counter pro-
tests in the form of blockades and sit-ins organised by the anti-fascist group Red October 
(Roter Oktober) and the civil society network Leipzig Takes a Seat (Leipzig nimmt Platz). [2] 
A march organised by the Youth Association of East Germany (Junge Landsmannschaft 
Ostdeutschland) and the Alliance for Action Against Forgetting (Aktionsbündnis gegen 
das Vergessen), a coalition of the National Democratic Party and otherwise non-affiliated 
groups, in Dresden on February 13, 2011 and counter protests organised by the anti-fascist 
alliance Nazi-free Dresden (Dresden Nazifrei). This event has been referred to as the largest 
neo-Nazi march in history and has historical significance since it took place on the date on 
which Dresden was bombed by the British Royal Air Force (RAF) and United States Army 
Air Force in 1945 during World War II. [3] An additional nationalist demonstration planned 
by the Youth Association of East Germany on February 19, 2011 and counter protests to 
block the demonstration organised by the anti-fascist group Nazi-free Dresden by mobilis-
ing anti-fascist groups from across Europe, civil society groups, political parties, and NGOs 
in and around Dresden.
The three events are related to one another. Not only are they geographically close, with 
both cities located in eastern Germany, but the marches in Leipzig were considered prepa-
rations for the larger events in Dresden, which received more attention from the mass 
media and are generally an important topic in the public discourse. The march planned 
for February 19 was against police repression and was organised as an addition to the Feb-
ruary 13 event. The different groups that form the counter protests against the marches 
have different political affiliations. The actors consisted of activists from anti-fascist and 
anarchist groups that engage in civil disobedience, including property damage; civil society 
groups and citizens who exclusively engage in non-violent civil disobedience; politicians 
from across the political spectrum who engage in symbolic action; the city of Dresden, 
which organised a human chain to symbolically protect the city; and the Church, which 
organised silent vigils. These actors can be divided into two larger groups: those who only 
engage in symbolic action and those who are prepared to act in violent and non-violent civil 
disobedience to form blockades against the nationalist demonstrations. The groups that 
form alliances on Twitter against the nationalist demonstrations are all represented by one 
hashtag. Despite the diversity of groups involved in the counter protests, the hashtag they 
recommend following on their mobilisation websites and blogs is the same. The networked 
publics that are composed surrounding the events are thus connected. Their tweets on the 
events are filtered along a certain hashtag, which constitutes the networked publics. 
The data used here is part of a larger dataset of qualitative case studies (Creswell, 1998) 
that is composed of different forms of online communication surrounding the events, 
including Facebook groups, YouTube videos and comments, blogs and websites for mobili-
sation, online coverage by institutionalised mass media and comments on this coverage, 
and memos written by one of the authors concerning observation of and informal inter-
views in the counter protests. The dataset used here includes a collection of Tweets with 
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the respective protest hashtags # before, during, and after the protest took place: Tweets 
with #19februar (4161); #13februar (1688); #l1610; and/or #RaZ10 (413). A total of 6262 
public Tweets, were collected, including login name and date. To present the results of the 
analysis, items were singled out for in-depth analysis and discussion. The open source con-
tent analysis tool Yoshikoder was used to count word frequencies, which helped generate 
an overview of the data. The most frequently appearing words in the tweets (once articles 
and personal pronouns are excluded) are ‘dresden’, followed by ‘nazis’, ‘police’, ‘Leipzig’, and 
‘antifa’. The word frequencies, together with the combinations of the most-frequent words, 
identify the main opponents in the anti-fascist protests. The frequency of the names of 
cities where the protests took place relates to the centrality of place and time and thus the 
immediacy and mobility of Twitter.
In the following, we examine Twitter’s role in the reproduction and renegotiation of 
power based on functionalities relative to textual representations of activist groups involved 
in protest and tactics they use to appropriate these functionalities for their struggle. The 
struggle that becomes apparent in the Twitter stream is, in this case, a struggle for visibility 
in the institutionalised media as well as a struggle between the nationalist demonstration 
and its opponents. The groups on both radical ends of the political spectrum in the con-
flict regard themselves as marginalised and underrepresented in the mainstream media 
(Neumayer, 2013). Twitter’s functionalities are appropriated to challenge the power rela-
tions between activists and institutionalised media, yet they also reproduce these power 
relations. The functionalities are understood with reference to the affordances of techno-
logical artefacts. According to Hutchby (2001), affordances are entwined with a set of social 
or technical rules governing their use. The affordances of technical artefacts thus do not 
“impose themselves upon humans’ actions” but, rather, set “limits on what is possible” in 
terms of their use. At the same time, there is a variety of possible responses to the “affor-
dances for action and interaction that a technology presents” (Hutchby, 2001, p. 453). In 
other words, the technology can be appropriated in specific situations, which we discuss as 
certain media practices and tactics in the protest events. These processes form on Twitter 
via use of the hashtag as a sorting device, publicly available direct messages, dissemination 
and sharing of values through retweets, and contestation and reproduction of power. Twit-
ter and its specific technical affordances are, however, embedded within a larger media 
environment, as becomes apparent in the data studied here. Our discussion of the use of 
Twitter as part of the contemporary media environment in anti-fascist protests to chal-
lenge as well as to maintain power is framed by the concept of power in networked publics.
Power in networked publics
Discourse in contentious politics is, according to Foucault (1978; 2003), related to the strug-
gle over truth. As a result, counter-discourses challenge the legitimacy or truth of dominant 
discourses. The construction of these different perspectives on truth is based on the politi-
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cal belief systems of groups that act in civil disobedience to challenge power and domi-
nation. Twitter is one platform on which these counter-discourses can be articulated in 
protest. The technical functionalities of Twitter, in common with those of other social web 
platforms, include a network structure that can provide space for expression of political 
opinion within networked publics. Ito (2008, p. 2) describes networked publics as “social, cul-
tural, and technological developments that have accompanied the growing engagement 
with digitally networked media.” The emphasis is on publics that emerge and increasingly 
communicate through networks provided by different media platforms, such as Twitter. 
Similarly, boyd (2011, p. 39) describes networked publics as “publics that are restructured 
by networked technologies,” simultaneously as a “space constructed through networked 
technologies” and as an “imagined collective that emerges as a result of the intersection 
of people, technology, and practice.” In our case, Twitter constitutes this space and at the 
same time entails and limits the communicative potentials of the people and its practice – 
thereby structuring and restructuring specific forms for public spheres.
The relationship between publics operating within a public sphere (Habermas, 1989) 
is not necessarily new but includes new forms of expression due to the networked struc-
ture of digital media technologies. As Splichal (2010, p. 28) remarks, “the public is a social 
category, whose members (discursively) act, form, and express opinions.” A public is there-
fore marked by a social category that provides the context for self-definition and sense 
of belonging. The public sphere, on the other hand, “is only its infrastructure” (Splichal, 
2010, p. 28). This infrastructure is more than just technical since all such frameworks are 
enmeshed in the political, cultural, and economic surroundings in which they operate. 
The spaces that facilitate the communication streams have functionalities that affect the 
agency or user manoeuvrability of the public in question. Coffee houses and salons have 
different functionalities than do social web platforms such as Twitter and can consequently 
encourage different interactions and forms of expression of political beliefs. The functional-
ities compose certain media environments as communicative spaces that allow for certain 
forms of communication, codes, and use behaviour. Although the media environment of 
Twitter and the set of rules on which it is based differ from those of coffee houses, they can 
be appropriated in a similar way, for instance for the articulation of oppositionality. The 
important question is not whether such networked publics and digital public spheres rep-
resent the public sphere in an idealised sense but rather how different publics “can be reac-
tors, (re)makers and (re)distributors, engaging in shared culture and knowledge through 
discourse and social exchange as well as through acts of media reception” (Ito, 2008, p. 3).
Habermas further implements the metaphor of the network into his theorisation of 
multiple publics and public spheres, mainly because of the complexities of modern societ-
ies. Although mass media remain the main frame of reference in the public sphere, Haber-
mas (1996, p. 373) accounts for different kinds and levels of public spheres, i.e. the “network 
that branches out into a multitude of overlapping international, national, regional, local, 
and subcultural arenas.” The network structure that Habermas describes is based on socio-
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cultural linkages rather than the technical media environment in more contemporary 
concepts of networked publics. The publics within the public sphere can, according to 
Habermas (1996), take the form of “episodic publics” in public places such as coffee houses 
or in the streets; “occasional” or “arranged” publics represented in events such as congresses 
or theatre performances; and “the abstract public sphere,” consisting of dispersed recipi-
ents of media content, i.e. readers, viewers, and listeners across the world. 
In a digital media environment such as Twitter, episodic, occasional, and abstract pub-
lics appear simultaneously since the environment allows for mass mobilisation and coordi-
nation and gives geographically distant people the feeling of presence and being involved 
in political action, i.e. abstract publics. At the same time, activists are engaged in arranged 
and occasional actions and use Twitter to coordinate. Consequently, in line with boyd 
(2011), the networked publics we analyse operate within the functionalities provided by 
Twitter, and Twitter influences the nature of the emerging imagined collective. However, as 
our case demonstrates, it is not just the technological infrastructure or architecture of the 
public sphere in question that decides the nature of the interactions taking place. This is 
instead determined by the cultural and political beliefs that members of the public already 
had prior to constructing themselves as networked publics. 
Discursive contestation from a radical democracy perspective (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985; 
Mouffe, 2005; Dahlberg, 2007) includes the communication of like-minded radical groups 
online before and when they enter public discourse. The tweets analysed in this article 
show not only discourse within the groups but also how such discourse is shaped by com-
munication with established media institutions, i.e. mass media. These are, however, not 
proletarian counter publics in the sense of Negt and Kluge (1972), with potential for revolu-
tion from below as organisations that are independent from and critical of capitalist ideol-
ogy. The counter publics in question are more in line with contemporary perspectives such 
as Fraser’s (1992) subaltern view, which emphasises oppositional interpretations of identi-
ties, interests, and needs among members of subordinated groups.
The discourses of the groups studied in this article are based on representations that 
can contribute to power and domination (Fairclough, 2003, p. 9). In the anti-fascist protests, 
these representations are driven by publics composed of anti-fascist groups and national-
ist demonstrations, which create a seemingly straightforward polarisation of two political 
positions. However, the unity that forms an opposition against the neo-Nazis consists of 
different subgroups with different agendas. Within the concept of “democratic pluralism” 
(Laclau & Mouffe, 1985; Mouffe, 2005), these differences are accepted within this specific 
event to achieve a political goal, i.e. the formation of blockades against the Nazis. The 
manifestation of anti-fascist discourses on Twitter therefore constitute networked publics 
defined by oppositionality, underlining the interactions between dominant and subordi-
nate (Brouwer, 2006; Warner, 2002). Because of the ‘fluid nature’ of networked publics, our 
data shows that it is the context that defines the contours of such oppositionality. 
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This involves not only Twitter’s technological functionalities but also its role in the 
communication spiral on a macro socio-cultural level. In this context, the neo-Nazi and 
anti-fascist discourses produced within Twitter flow from one communicative space to the 
next, allowing for the emergence of new forms of imagined collectives. In our case, this is 
due to mediatising technological convergence and social web and network convergence 
(Dwyer, 2010) in which the communication initiated on Twitter flows from one platform 
to the next in a multichannel and multimodal form (Castells, 2009). In the communication 
flows analysed here, the interaction thus does not stop on Twitter but is picked up by other 
media as a cross-media coverage flow in which temporalities of online media such as Twit-
ter are hybridised (Chadwick, 2011) with those of the mass media. 
This flow of communication and its creation of different forms for networked publics, 
depending on the multimodal and multichannel contexts in which they appear, is encap-
sulated in complex power relations in which it is indeed the context that decides the oppo-
sitionality in question. Our data therefore shows that oppositionality not only emerges 
between the two groups (anti-fascists against neo-Nazis) but also how the groups are rep-
resented in the mass media. It is, however, important to note that these power relations 
are not stable but are constructed and reconstructed in discourse. In other words, power 
is a creative, playful, and productive generator that influences representation on Twitter as 
well as between Twitter and the large-scale multimodal and multichannel hybridisation of 
contemporary media in general.
In Foucault’s (2002) terms, productive resistance is a precondition for the emergence of 
power relations. Furthermore, power relations are based on two indispensable elements: 
“‘the other’ (the one over whom power is exercised) is recognised and maintained to the 
very end as a subject who acts; and that, faced with a relationship of power, a whole field of 
‘responses, reactions, results, and possible interventions may open up’” (Foucault, 2002, p. 
340). Even though processes of macro power mould publics according to ruling discursive 
formations, power is always a set of actions upon other actions and is reconstructed and 
challenged in discourse. 
As will be demonstrated in our analysis, this is also the case between the emerging 
networked publics of the apparently straightforward alliance of a set of publics under the 
common term anti-fascist (activists, civil society groups, citizens, politicians, city of Dres-
den, the Church) against the neo-Nazis. It furthermore influences how these are consti-
tuted and widened out in the hybridisation processes of the communication spiral. In 
other words, we focus on how the inherent functionalities of Twitter shape the commu-
nications (hashtags, direct messages, and retweets in particular), the context in which the 
communication appears, and how these shape the power relations within and between 
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Political positioning by hashtags
The hashtag in the anti-fascist protests is primarily a technical filtering tool for a Twitter 
stream but also carries meaning as a “social marker” (Zappavigna, 2011) to identify with a 
group in contestation and to develop a sense of imagined community (Gruzd et al., 2011) of 
individuals who support a cause but are not necessarily physically connected. The Twitter 
stream as a filter that produced a chronological and immediate narrative of the events was, 
however, used by journalists, activists, citizens, and organisers of both the counter protests 
and the nationalist demonstrations. The segregation of two Twitter streams identified by 
the hashtag was particularly obvious at the Leipzig site, where the counter protests used 
a different hashtag than did the nationalist demonstrations. This becomes apparent from 
the following tweets: 
Anti-fascists tweet with #L1610! Nazis tweet with #RaZ10! (15/10/2010)
RaZ seems to be the right-wing #hash, #L1610 the one of the democrats. Please correct me 
if this is wrong. (16/10/2010)
The question about the correct hashtag was essential and associated with a certain group 
as ‘Nazis’ or ‘right-wing’ versus ‘anti-fascists’ or ‘democrats’. The filtering function of the 
hashtag was used to separate the Twitter stream of the organisers of the nationalist dem-
onstrations from that of the activists and civil society networks involved in blockades. 
This symbolic division of the two opposing groups formed two different but interrelated 
narratives of the events. The segregation was, however, bipolar and did not differentiate 
between publics that formed alliances in the counter protests. Although the civil society 
network Leipzig Takes a Seat mobilised separately from the anti-fascist group Red October, 
they used the same hashtag since they supported the same cause, i.e. blocking the nation-
alist demonstrations. The hashtag represented the immediate single-issue cause of block-
ing the Nazis rather than the different political positions of the publics that formed the 
alliance against the nationalist demonstrations. Using the hashtag as a filtering and sorting 
tool assembles the implied functionality of the technology. An additional social – and in 
this case, political – component was included by groups or individuals identifying with the 
cause by tweets using the respective hashtag. The social meaning of the hashtag as a form 
of political identification in the conflict became visible by its absence, as this tweet shows:
Nazis use #13februar as hashtag. Something is going wrong (13/02/2011). 
Although the hashtag was used to filter the Twitter stream concerning the events on Feb-
ruary 13 in Dresden, it included perspectives across the political spectrum and separated 
neither the specific groups nor their different perspectives on the events. The critique of 
the lack of a different hashtag for the enemy in the conflict implies that the hashtag is also 
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used to identify with a specific cause that goes beyond solely producing a stream concern-
ing the events.
The identification with one side in the conflict also becomes apparent when users 
referred to the Other’s hashtag to strategically confuse, intervene in, or criticise the Other 
in playful and humorous way:
#RaZ10 #L1610 they probably need all 35 people in the streets, nobody left for tweeting 
(16/10/2010)
Spam the Nazi Twitter tags #GeMa, #DenkDran! (13/02/2011)
The fact that the hashtag is used to filter information on one side of the conflict was used 
strategically if the opponents were also meant to receive the message. If this was the case, 
both hashtags were used. Although the tweets can potentially reach a large audience, users 
are aware of the filtering components and the messages are thus produced for specific 
networked publics depending on the implied recipients. ‘Spamming’ the hashtag of the 
opponents was tactically used to symbolically carry out the physical blockades online by 
blocking the Twitter stream filtered by the hashtag. These elements of using Twitter are 
playful and performative, using humour as a primary component but not referring to a 
larger political message than that of blocking the common enemy, i.e. the neo-Nazis, in 
favour of the broad alliance necessary in contestation.
Awareness of the hashtag as a filtering tool for the different groups involved in the 
conflict was also used tactically to confuse and mislead activists by deliberately giving 
wrong information, using the opponents’ hashtag to enter their Twitter stream. Especially 
in Leipzig, the hashtag of the opponent was used tactically to implement wrong infor-
mation such as fake ad hoc demonstrations and gatherings. This tactic plays on the fluid 
nature of networked publics constituted by the functionalities of Twitter. However, the 
fake information and mobilisation tweets were soon revealed by identification of the user 
profile, which also revealed the political position within the event, which could have nega-
tive consequences for the author of a tweet. This underlines the circular power at play on 
Twitter in the events. The quantity of tweets is important for strengthening the political 
cause of the counter protests but can also be counterproductive if identification of people 
behind Twitter profiles is used against them by authorities regarding acts of civil disobedi-
ence. Power is thus reconstructed and challenged on Twitter by a set of actions upon other 
actions of the different networked publics in the events.
The hashtag was used not only to follow actions within the groups but also to observe 
actions of the conflicting party, to monitor, interfere, and show belonging to a political 
position within the events. Consequently, despite the hashtag’s functionality as a filter for 
different streams of information, it also symbolically represented a political position in con-
flict. Use of the respective hashtag in the events was used to publicly show affiliation with 
one side in the conflict. Through this identification, the two sides in the conflict interacted 
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with one another and symbolically reproduced the street actions via textual representa-
tions on Twitter. These representations are, however, part of a larger media environment, 
as is, for example, evident in the institutionalised mass media’s observation of the stream of 
information created by the Twitter hashtag as well as the occurrence of tweets referring to 
mass media reports, YouTube videos, or mobilisation websites. 
Direct messages to the Other
Messages directed to a specific person by @username are close to interpersonal communi-
cation despite being publicly available and included in the information stream through use 
of the respective hashtag. Most of the direct messages were directed to members within 
groups, mainly to core tweeters, to keep people informed of current events in the streets. 
These core tweeters were activist groups as well as media institutions or alternative media. 
The Twitter hashtag and Twitter profiles of certain groups such as Nazi-free Dresden were 
announced on the mobilisation websites and blogs of groups on both sides in the conflict 
but especially in the counter protests as reliable and immediate sources of information. 
They served as central distributors of information on the events, having large numbers of 
followers as well as acting as sources of reliable and immediate information on the protest. 
This tweet was directed to the profile of Nazi-free Dresden:
@[username] RT: #Nazis are not on their way to [name of station] but to the central station! 
#19februar (19/02/2011)
The sending of information to the usernames of central activist profiles for redistribu-
tion and in order to inform participants in the streets was a common tactic in all of the 
events. This represents the centrality of some users for disseminating information despite 
the apparently flat hierarchies on Twitter and in the organisation of the counter protests. 
Interaction with journalists by addressing them directly gives the activists the opportunity 
to immediately react to media coverage as well as to provide information:
@[journalist]: we just received pics of the damage at the [place]: [link to pics] #19februar #fb 
(19/02/2011)
Activists used the immediacy of Twitter and the possibility of directly contacting journal-
ists and interacting with media institutions to present their perspectives on the events. 
These forms of tweets show that reporting in the mainstream media plays an important 
role for the activists, especially in the counter protests, which use mass mobilisation as a 
key strategy in the blockades. Twitter was, however, also used to criticise reports in the 
mainstream media. The centrality of institutionalised mass media thus underlines the role 
of Twitter as part of a larger media environment with power relations in place. The institu-
tionalised media have a central place in the communication spiral concerning the events, 
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with the networked publics taking advantage of the functionalities of Twitter for nurturing 
this centrality as well as challenging it.
Humour and playful rhetoric are tactics on Twitter for challenging power. This becomes 
obvious in the addressing of the opposite side in the conflict, which was already visible 
through use of the hashtag but also visible in tweets directed to the Twitter profiles of the 
organisers of the nationalist demonstrations: 
@[username] Nazis also have mobile phones. Are they allowed to? Did The Fuehrer approve 
that? #13Februar (13/02/2011)
The anti-fascists depict the Other (the neo-Nazis) as fundamentally centralised and driven 
by leadership. Direct messages do not usually lead to real discussion or argumentation 
but rather to reactions to comments, which underlines the immediacy of the platform for 
expressing an opinion in a given moment related to current action:
User 2: @[username 1] sure they have the right to demonstrate... and they also have the right 
to an (even bigger) #counterprotest! #13februar (13/02/2011)
User 1: @[username 2] There is no right to freedom of speech. Then the right wing would 
have it too. #13februar (13/02/2011)
These direct messages are part of a discussion between two individual users, carried out 
publicly. Freedom of speech as a fundamental right was claimed by both the right-wing 
groups as a reaction to the massive blockades of the anti-fascists and civil society but also 
anti-fascists since they did not have legal permission to protest close to the marches of 
neo-Nazis. In direct messages, these issues are addressed and discussed within groups but 
also across the political spectrum, again pointing towards the fluid nature of networked 
publics. The context dictates the contours of the imagined collectives and the relationships 
between them in conflict and contestation, and the different publics reacting, redistribut-
ing but also renegotiating power.
Sharing values with retweets
The retweet’s main functionality is for multiplying information through the technical net-
work infrastructure of Twitter. However, the retweet was also appropriated to express 
oppositionality in the counter protests. The retweet was thus used to symbolically repro-
duce on Twitter the blockades on the streets: 
Done. RT @[username]: blocking Nazis – also on Twitter: @[username 1] @[username 2] @
[username 3] @[username 4] #13februar (13/02/2011)
Blockades on Twitter by retweeting to spam specific user accounts of the organisers of the 
nationalist demonstrations are a symbolic act for sharing the values of the protesters in 
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the streets as well as for reproducing the street blockades. At the same time, they express 
the low effort that the action takes compared to the protests in the streets. Generally, the 
retweet was used to multiply information and values but not always to challenge the main-
stream and to produce counter-discourse. Sometimes, it was also a multiplier of articles in 
news media:
RT @[username]: The LKA Saxony stormed the office of Nazi-free Dresden this evening [link 
to media coverage] #19februar #dd_nazifrei (19/02/2011)
This report took up the information by the activists and reported accordingly and was 
thus retweeted to distribute the information. Especially in the case of links to videos, blog 
posts, or IndyMedia articles, Twitter was used as a multiplier for spreading information 
produced by both the activists and mass media in order to show their perspective on the 
events. Use of retweets as a multiplier of information supports the implied values in a mes-
sage and the respective political position. Multiplying information through retweets can 
strengthen existing power as well as challenge it, depending on the tweet that is multiplied 
and whether it expresses oppositionality or supports power. Playfulness and humour can 
be used tactically to trigger the multiplication of a message in the form of retweets and to 
foster its dissemination within a networked public as well as in the larger communication 
spiral concerning the events.
Contesting power on Twitter
Interaction with the news media plays an important role in challenging the mainstream 
discourse in contestation. Activists try to challenge their portrayal in the news media and 
to communicate their political cause in contrast with the violent, chaotic picture that is 
often created (Juris, 2005). One of the most frequently retweeted messages in the #19feb-
ruar stream is a YouTube video recorded on a mobile phone that shows activists’ perspec-
tive on violent action. The power relations between mainstream and alternative media 
can potentially be challenged since Twitter can be used to multiply information to chal-
lenge dominant discourse. Twitter was used strategically to disseminate ‘true’ information 
through links to videos, pictures, blog posts, and articles in alternative media concerning 
incidents in which activists are solely presented as violent in mass media. The general dis-
trust towards the media and its reporting is expressed several times: 
Dear Aljazeera, please send us reporters, our media are either censored by the state or pimp 
their ratings #19februar #policeviolence (19/02/2011)
Although the protest was covered in foreign news media such as DerStandard.at and live 
reporting by AlJazeera, the national public broadcaster was criticised for insufficient cover-
age. At the same time, a local alternative radio station in Dresden used Twitter to distribute 
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information especially to journalists from centre-left newspapers for direct dialogue with 
the activists: 
RT @[journalist]: did a pepper ball hit anyone? #19februar (I am writing an article about it, 
right now) (19/02/2011)
The communication triggered by Twitter is not limited to alternative media, counter pub-
lics, or the mass media but takes on specific roles in the communication spiral depending 
on the context. Twitter is thus used as a multiplier of articles in the news media as well as 
in alternative media. Twitter is therefore also capitalised on by the macro media, either in 
the form of information seeking by individual journalists or in general representation of the 
events taking place. It is used both as a specific representation of the truth and as an ele-
ment of seeking that truth. 
Consequently, Twitter can be appropriated to produce oppositionality, depending on 
the context. Participants in the counter protest reflect on the role of the technology in the 
protest events, with trust as a major component. A participant in the counter protests in 
Leipzig concludes with the following tweet:
I have never been a friend of Twitter, but today it was very useful (16/10/2010)
There is, however, also distrust of Twitter due to its corporate and legal influence: 
#Twitter seems to have disabled many Twitter clients. Just in time for #19februar. Is this what 
capitalist democracy looks like? #linke (19/02/2011)
Twitter was developed within a capitalist environment and thus bears limitations for 
groups that try to fight this system. This entails another consequence that can be a chal-
lenge when people act in civil disobedience but use Twitter. In other words, the corporate 
influence that Habermas (1989) anticipates in the mass media as a challenge to the public 
sphere also challenges equal distribution of power in platforms based on user-generated 
content such as Twitter. The publicity of the information, which certainly has a positive 
effect for mobilisation and dissemination of information, can be restricted due to interven-
tion by the corporation that provides the infrastructure of the microblogging platform. 
Although Twitter is used successfully for the mobilisation and coordination of mass action 
across political positions, it is criticised for being corporate, and more radical groups of the 
alliance criticise its visibility because it exposes them to a high level of risk when acting in 
civil disobedience (see Askanius & Gustafsson, 2010 for similar results). 
In mass mobilisation, the functionalities enable the emergence of imagined collectives 
not only for the counter protest in the streets but also for supporters of the actions who 
are not physically present. Tweets can thus express solidarity with the cause supported by 
the protesters in the streets: 
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I can’t be there today, but I’m thinking of you #L1610 (16/10/2010).
The Twitter stream is thus an opportunity to create awareness about the events through 
the network. In this case, it is not necessarily the Twitter stream itself but rather followers 
of a profile who become aware of the events by reading the tweets of a person who they 
follow. By showing solidarity with the actions, the users become part of the networked pub-
lics by supporting the cause without being physically present. Although this only includes a 
very low level of actual engagement, their tweets are an important part of the communica-
tion spiral created concerning the events. In the Dresden events, the hashtag #19februar 
became a trending topic worldwide, and the political single-issue cause of blocking the 
nationalist demonstrations (though decontextualised from the broader political projects 
of the subgroups united in the counter protests) temporarily became an important topic in 
the twittersphere. However, the unity of civil society, anti-fascist groups, politicians, NGOs, 
and citizens of Dresden in the blockades dispersed again after the events. 
Furthermore, as an example of the fluid nature of networked publics and how context 
dependent they are, a bridge to another networked public emerged because of a misunder-
standing. #19februar on Twitter became a trending topic worldwide and was mistaken for 
the date of Justin Bieber’s birthday in the international Twitter community, which judged 
the “missing y” in the German spelling of “February” (Februar) to be a spelling mistake. 
This not only points to the fragility of the communication conducted through the Twit-
ter hashtag but also to the social cultural context. The celebrity effect replaces the actual 
political cause by decontextualisation from a specific language and social context, under-
lining the fluidity of the networked publics on Twitter.
In another characteristic of networked publics and the different imagined collectives 
that emerge from Twitter as a communicative space, we detect a faction that criticises the 
methods used by more radical groups:
RT @[username]: nice that you prevent the Nazi march. But can you ever do it without vio-
lence? Too bad. (19/02/2011)
Some participants in the blockades differentiate themselves from more radical activists, 
not due to the political cause they are pursuing but to the methods used in contesta-
tion. Although supporting the political cause of the anti-fascists, they do not accept the 
methods that they use, as is expressed after the protest events. The different political posi-
tions become apparent on Twitter but are less obvious than on other platforms that rather 
foster communication, discussion, and interaction instead of Twitter’s fostering of immedi-
acy and mobility. The alliances that form in the protest events are thus temporary, directed 
against the common enemy, and disperse again after the events. In the communication 
spiral produced across different networked publics that form alliances in the protest, Twit-
ter and its functionalities are part of a larger media environment.
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Tactics of contestation by networked publics on Twitter
By analysing the Twitter stream concerning physical protest events, we identify the follow-
ing tactics for reproducing and challenging power:
Sharing values: In the anti-fascist protests, many different groups with different political 
beliefs unite behind a common cause. This becomes especially obvious from the hashtag, 
which works as a filtering tool for the Twitter stream concerning the event but also carries 
political meaning by representing a political position within the protest. However, political 
values and belonging to a certain group can also be observed in the textual representations 
through wording and rhetoric. Sharing values, for example by solidarity tweets, without 
being physically present in the conflict supports the cause by strengthening the Twitter 
stream, i.e. creates symbolic value by the frequency of tweets within a specific hashtag.
Online blockades: One of the most obvious tactics for symbolically reproducing physi-
cal blockades in the streets on Twitter is using the hashtag or direct messages to block the 
Twitter stream or profiles of the Other as well as to tactically confuse participants of the 
conflicting group in street action. The symbolic blockades that do not include acts of civil 
disobedience as their counterparts in the streets support the political cause associated 
with the action but only have symbolic meaning. However, on this symbolic level, they can 
be supportive in challenging power and domination by networked publics on Twitter and 
the hierarchies and power relations that constitute this public.
Mutual monitoring: The hashtag is used as a filtering device for a political cause but 
also as a means of constructing political identity relative to the Other. Mutual monitoring 
between the participants in nationalist demonstrations and the counter protests is one 
of the tactics for knowing about the actions of the opposing groups in the streets. At the 
same time, observation of the Other’s Twitter stream leads to reaction and activists com-
menting on the Other and judging their actions. Activists, journalists, and authorities all 
strategically use these streams of information on Twitter to observe these emerging coun-
ter publics. Monitoring can thus also be an expression of existing power relations when 
used by authorities or mainstream media to inform their own actions and reporting.
Dissemination: Links to additional media content or user-generated content on plat-
forms such as YouTube or blogs play an important role in disseminating information on 
Twitter. The strategic use of core profiles such as those of journalists or core activist groups 
that can redistribute information to a wider public due to a higher number of follow-
ers reflects the centrality of a few users. Despite the apparent openness of Twitter (since 
anyone can publish), activists strategically interact within traditional hierarchies that are 
transferred to the network structure on Twitter.
Challenging domination: The protest hashtag #19februar was a trending topic world-
wide even though activists criticised the public broadcaster for insufficiently reporting the 
events. Twitter can be used strategically to challenge domination by disseminating infor-
mation to offer a different perspective on protest. It can also be used to interact with 
journalists, for example via direct messages, in order to influence the dominant discourse 
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in the mass media: This is especially used in events that have already gained attention in 
the media discourse. At the same time, traditional power structures are reproduced by 
core profiles that dominate the networked publics on Twitter as well as symbolically in the 
textual representations on Twitter. 
Spectacle, play, humour, and performativity: Playfulness and humour are important ele-
ments of the Twitter stream in the anti-fascist protests. The centrality of celebrities and the 
perfomative and playful character of the Tweets can be considered a symbolic reproduc-
tion of the physical events in the streets. This, however, also underlines the perception of 
the Tweets as ‘noise’ or ‘spam’ without any clear political message. The almost apolitical 
character of the events in favour of a clear cause and common enemy in form of the ‘neo-
Nazis’ is a tactic for mass mobilisation that is reproduced on Twitter. The humorous and 
performative character of the tweets is thus a tactic that results from the broader political 
context of the events.
Conclusion
As a communicative space, Twitter allows certain imagined collectives to emerge as net-
worked publics. Through the functionalities of Twitter, existing imagined collectives 
become constituted as networked publics when they engage in the specific form of digi-
tal communication for which Twitter allows. The publics that are constituted on Twitter 
unite groups with different political positions for a specific cause, i.e. they overcome differ-
ences within “democratic pluralism” (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985) to form a collective against a 
“common enemy” (Mouffe in: Carpentier & Cammaerts, 2006). These heterogeneous col-
lectives are, however, unsustainable and disperse again after the event. The publics that 
are constructed on Twitter within these events are in Habermas’ (1996) terms, “abstract” 
or “occasional” publics, arranged around a specific event, in this case a political event that 
bears elements of a performance. These microplublics are in constant interaction with the 
macropublics that are constituted by the mass media, which we have described as a com-
munication spiral. The publics that become visible on Twitter thus do not exist or emerge 
on the microblogging platform but are interwoven into an existing network of power. The 
networked publics on Twitter in contestation are thus instead networks among networks, 
enmeshed in a complex power game. The functionalities of Twitter enable certain forms 
of communication within and between the different networked publics and add to the 
larger spiral of communications concerning the events rather than enabling a new form of 
political resistance. 
Notes
1 All quotes from the data are German in original and translated by one of the authors.
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